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all of the sessions. In each treatment, there was a conversion rate of 100 experimental units to €1.  
Average earnings were €14, including a €5 show-up fee. 
Each participant was given the role of either a high-talent worker or a firm.  The number 
of participants allocated to each category depended on the treatment.  We decided to have 
automated low-talent workers, as their decisions were quite trivial (reject contracts with a high 
entry fee, as this would generate negative earnings for the worker, and accept contracts with low 
entry fees, since this provides positive earnings for both firms and workers.)
7  Since we expected 
virtually no deviation from this strategy, we programmed the low-talent workers to follow it.  It 
was made common information in the instructions that the low-talent workers were robots and 
that they were programmed to follow this strategy.
8 
In order to facilitate comprehension, we couched our experiment in terms of the firm 
being the owner of a food concession stand on campus.
9  Note that the firm’s income is only 
what is received in rental fees.  In the first part of a period (or first stage of the interaction), the 
firm is willing to rent the stand (to a worker) for one week; we restrict the firm to charging the 
low entry fee of 15 in order to provide a high-talent worker with a real choice, thus enabling us 
to gather useful data.
10  If a firm or a worker does not end up in a contractual relationship, he or 
she receives nothing for that stage.  If a high-talent worker accepts a contract, he or she chooses 
either low or high output, with the worker earning more in that stage from high output.  Each 
firm is then informed about the output level (reject, low, or high) of the worker in the first stage, 
                                                 
7 Even negative reciprocity could not come into play with human low-talent workers, as the firm is not being 
antagonistic by choosing the lower entry fee. 
8 The robots were programmed with different response times and one proceeded to the next step only once all the 
players had entered their decisions. Therefore, the only evidence that a firm had concerning the nature of the worker 
was the choice made by the worker. 
9 We attempted to insure comprehension by requiring participants to complete a “Comprehension questionnaire,” 
which can be found in Appendix A, along with a sample of the experimental instructions. 
10 Choosing the high fee of 33 gives an expected gain of only 11 for the firm in that stage.  In addition, allowing the 
firm to choose the high fee in this stage would allow it to uncover the type of its worker but at the risk of having its 
offer rejected if matched with a low-talent worker. This would not test the ratchet effect.   10 
but not the worker’s type.   
In the second stage, the firm is free to choose either the low entry fee (30) or a high entry 
fee (66).   Low-talent workers make their programmed choices, while high-talent workers choose 
to either reject the offer or to provide low or high output.  In order to increase the cost of 
inefficiencies, this second stage ‘lasted’ two weeks, rather than one week.  Once again, firms 
were informed about the output chosen.  Table 1 below presents the game and all possible 
payoffs.  The main feature we wish to note is that if a high-talent worker chooses high output, he 
will receive 35 in the first stage, but will face a high rental fee if the firm realizes that she is 
matched with a high-talent worker, and will receive 34 in the second stage (so 69 in total).  In 
comparison, the high-talent worker who chooses low output in the first stage earns 22.5 then and, 
if the firm subsequently chooses a low rental fee, earns 70 in the second stage (so 92.5 in total).  
Notice that, by construction, the choice of type-appropriate outputs by both worker types 
corresponds, literally, to a first-best allocation under the assumptions of the model.   23 
data (1) and on each treatment separately (2 to 4).  The explanatory variables include the choice 
by the worker of a high output in the first stage.  We interact this variable with each treatment in 
the first regression.  In regression (3), we add a dummy indicating whether the firm was selected 
in the first stage and the same variable is interacted with the choice of a high output by the 
worker.  
The regressions confirm the patterns we have mentioned for firms.  There is no 
significant time trend except in the excess-firms treatment, which probably indicates the 
presence of learning.  Individual characteristics play no role in the firm’s behavior.  Compared to 
the baseline treatment, firms were substantially more likely to offer a high-fee contract in the 
excess-workers treatment and substantially less likely to do so in the excess-firms treatment.  
Overall, firms were more likely to choose the high-fee contract after having observed a high 
output in the first stage.  In the excess-firms treatment, being selected in the first stage reduces 
the likelihood of offering a high fee in the second stage by 5.7 percentage points but the worker 
being a high-talent agent instead increases the likelihood by 21.7 percentage points. 
Regarding earnings, the firms naturally earn more (and the workers less) when there is 
competition among workers, since they are able to extract the informational rent of the workers 
and to select their employees.  In the excess-firms treatment, firms earn almost the same profit as 
in the baseline because even though they are able to extract the informational rent of the agents, 
the workers can select the firms for which they are willing to work.
22   
 
                                                 
22 The average earning for all firms is 47.11 in the baseline, 22.62 with excess firms, and 51.21 with excess workers 
(the corresponding numbers if we consider only matched firms are 47.11, 45.41, and 62.41). The average earning for 
all high-talent workers is 80.16 in the baseline, 103.80 with excess firms, and 43.66 with excess workers (the 
corresponding numbers if we consider only matched high-talent workers are 80.16, 103.80, and 70.46). 